

TOP SECRET

25X1



19 January 1963

Copy No. C 105

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9


Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9

19 January 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


C O N T E N T S

1. Cuba--Coastal Missile: Soviet AS-1 Kennel air-to-surface missile detected in Havana parade on 2 January. (Page 1)



25X1

3. Communist Bloc: Chinese delegate to East German party congress not fully responsive to Khrushchev's plea for a halt in polemics. (Page 3)
4. Sino-Indian Dispute: Indian leaders feel that acceptance of Colombo conference proposals will not lead to border negotiations. (Page 5)
5. Congo: Tshombé seeks guarantees for his personal safety. (Page 6)




25X6

7. Britain--Labor Party: Hugh Gaitskell dead. (Page 8)




25X6

9. Spain: Spanish ready to negotiate US bases agreement. (Page 10)
10. Notes:  Iraq; Thailand-Malaya; Bolivia. (Page 11)

25X1

25X1



630118 2

COASTAL DEFENSE MISSILE DISPLAYED IN HAVANA PARADE ON 2 JANUARY 1963

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 January 1963

DAILY BRIEF

*Cuba--Coastal Missile: Recent analysis reveals that the coastal defense missile shown in the Havana parade on 2 January is a version of the Soviet AS-1 Kennel 55-nm. air-to-surface missile.

Changes have apparently been made to the AS-1 missile to adapt it to a coastal defense role. Major changes include modifications of the vertical tail design and of the guidance antenna on the tail. As a coastal defense weapon, it probably has a range of 30 to 40 nautical miles with a payload on the order of 2,200 pounds.

The Havana parade missile appears to be the same one observed at the coastal defense installation at Banes and deployed at the other two cruise-missile sites in Cuba.

The Kennel is a cruise missile with a high subsonic speed. It is believed to have been carried only by TU-16 (Badger) jet medium bombers.

There are no known combat aircraft in Cuba that could accommodate the Kennel system. A few Cuban transport-type aircraft have the weight-lifting capacity for this missile, but it is highly unlikely that these aircraft could be sufficiently modified to employ this weapon system.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9

*Communist Bloc: The speech given by the Chinese Communist delegate to the East German party congress on 18 January was not fully responsive to Khrushchev's plea for a halt in the Sino-Soviet polemics.

Wu Hsiu-chuan indicated that Peiping would find it "helpful" if there were a further initiative by Khrushchev, who was implicitly charged with "continuing to make attacks" even while he called for their cessation.

Wu referred to "fully justifiable" worries among many Communists that the tactics employed against Communist China were "creating a split." The developments at the East German party congress since Khrushchev's speech on 16 January reflected a concerted maneuver by the Soviet bloc to isolate the Chinese Communists and blame them for any continuation or intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Khrushchev's call for a polemical truce and his equivocal endorsement of another international Communist conference in the distant future--seconded by East European delegates--were intended to disarm Peiping's attack on Soviet leadership and strategy. Wu agreed that a discontinuation of attacks against "fraternal" parties was a necessary preliminary to an international Communist conference. He indicated, however, that China does not regard Yugoslavia as a "fraternal" party, and he reiterated the standard Chinese positions on such issues as Albania's orthodoxy and on his country's record in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Peiping may feel that Khrushchev's seeming offer of the olive branch imposes on the Chinese the

tactical necessity of some conciliatory gestures, and Wu's remarks do not preclude a decision by Communist China to moderate its propaganda. There are no indications of real progress thus far, however, toward a durable truce. TASS criticized Wu for his "completely inadmissible tone." The uproar in the audience that attended Wu's speech also reflected the deep-seated differences that continue to prevent any bridging of the rift between Moscow and Peiping.

25X1

25X1

19 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

4

Sino-Indian Dispute: (C) Contrary to the public impression created following Prime Minister Bandaranaike's talks in New Delhi, Indian leaders do not expect that their qualified acceptance of the Colombo conference proposals will lead to serious negotiations of the border dispute. (D)

(C) Nehru made clear in letters to Mrs. Bandaranaike that the Indians accept the proposals only as modified by them during the Ceylonese prime minister's visit.

(C) Foreign Secretary Desai expects the Chinese to reject the proposals as modified by India. He feels that even if an agreement on a cease-fire is reached, the immediate result will only be "talks about talks." Desai and Defense Minister Chavan agree that Indian acceptance of the modified proposals does not remove the need for a military build-up. (D)

*Congo: In talks with the British, Belgian, and US consuls on 18 January, Tshombé was seeking guarantees for his personal safety and assurances that the UN plan would still be applied.

Tshombé claimed that Adoula's and Kasavubu's letters to U Thant on the amnesty were only "vague promises" which gave no real assurances to him or his colleagues and suggested that Leopoldville had ulterior motives. Tshombé said that although the UN plan provided for an amnesty law to be submitted to Parliament, it appeared that the UN reintegration plan had been abandoned. The Katangan leader asserted that he would "live up to the letter" of his agreement on entry of UN forces into Kolwezi.

Tshombé also expressed concern over the future of the Katangan forces, particularly those "in the bush." He said he feared that if they were not reassured on their future, they would not surrender and would turn to brigandage.

19 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

6

25X6

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9

*Britain: The death of Hugh Gaitskell materially changes the domestic political situation by substantially weakening the Labor Party in a pre-election period.

Gaitskell was the only figure in the party able to command the support of most of its factions. He is the only Laborite acknowledged by the public to have the ability to handle the prime ministership.

Gaitskell's possible successors at one time or another have all aroused the antagonism of factions within the party. The most prominent are George Brown, the strongly pro-NATO and pro-US deputy party leader, and Harold Wilson, foreign affairs spokesman who enjoys wide support among the left wing. A possible compromise candidate is James Callaghan, party spokesman on Treasury affairs. Callaghan is considered a political moderate on most issues.

25X6

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9

Spain: The Spanish appear ready to renegotiate the US bases agreement which expires this September.

Foreign Minister Castiella informed US Ambassador Woodward on 17 January that Spain does not desire a bid to join NATO, and wishes the US to consider it as close a collaborator as its NATO allies. He said his government is convinced a new bases agreement can be concluded or the present one extended for five years in accordance with its terms, if "US reciprocal actions" are satisfactory.

Madrid has been pressing for some time for continuation of large-scale economic aid, and for relaxation of the US insistence that Spain purchase its military equipment largely in the US. Spanish officials have also alluded to the possibility of some new form of alliance, possibly a formal US-Spain mutual defense treaty.

NOTES

25X1

Iraq: Qasim again is making peace overtures to Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani in an effort to end the 18-month-old Kurdish revolt. Qasim has apparently begun to realize that the Iraqi Army has neither the will nor the ability to end the revolt. Previous negotiations between Qasim and Barzani have foundered on Qasim's refusal to meet Kurdish demands for local autonomy.

25X1

Thailand-Malaya: Thailand and Malaya plan joint security operations in March against an estimated 400 Communist terrorists in the southern border provinces of Thailand. These terrorists, holdouts of the Communist rebellion in Malaya, have long been using Thailand as a sanctuary and as a base for raids into Malaya. They are also reportedly engaged in increased local recruitment and terrorist action against Thai provincial officials.

25X1

*Bolivia: The leftist Bolivian Government has announced the appointment of a consul general to Havana and reportedly expects to reopen its office there shortly. Although the Bolivian Government has continued diplomatic relations with Cuba, it has not had an official mission in Havana since Castro came to power. Only four other Latin American countries--Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay --now maintain missions in Cuba.

25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP70T00975A006800160001-9

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP70T00975A006800160001-9

TOP SECRET